Medicare—the government program that provides health insurance to older people in the United States—faces grave fiscal problems as the baby boom generation ages. Medicare is financed by payroll taxes, which means that those now working are paying for the health care of those now retired. As the baby boom generation moves from middle into old age, the proportion of the retired population will increase, while the proportion of the working population will decrease. The consequence is that the amount of money available for each Medicare beneficiary, when adjusted for health care inflation, will shrink.
In theory, taxes could be increased dramatically to make up the shortfall – an unlikely and politically difficult proposition. The second alternative—to put it bluntly but accurately—is rationing. Less money available per senior citizen would mean less treatment, including less of the treatments necessary to prevent death. For want of treatment, many people whose lives could have been saved by medical treatment would perish against their will. The third alternative is that, as the government contribution decreases, the shortfall could be made up by payments from older people themselves, so that their Medicare health insurance premium could voluntarily be financed partly by the government and partly from their own income and savings.
It is not widely understood that, as a result of legislative changes in 1997 and 2003 undertaken at the behest of the National Right to Life Committee, this third alternative had become law. Under the title of “private fee-for-service plans,” there is an option in Medicare under which senior citizens can choose health insurance whose value, under the law in effect through 2010 [endnote 1], was not limited by what the government may pay toward it. These plans could set premiums and reimbursement rates for providers without upward limits imposed by government regulation.
This means that such plans would not have been forced to limit treatment, as long as senior citizens were left free to choose to pay more for them. Medicare covers everyone of retirement age, regardless of income or assets. Yet, because of budget constraints, the Medicare reimbursement rates for health care providers tend to be below the cost of giving the care—a deficit that can only accelerate as cost pressures on Medicare increase with the retirement of the baby boomers. To cope with this, providers engage in “cost shifting” by using funds they receive in payment for treating privately insured working people to help make up for what the providers lose when treating retirees under Medicare. Thus, comparatively low-income workers often effectively subsidize higher-income retirees.
However, when middle-income retirees are free voluntarily to add their own money on top of the government contribution, through a private fee-for-service plan, they stop being the beneficiaries of cost-shifting and become contributors to it. Thus, preserving this option without premium price controls would not only have allowed retirees who could afford it to reduce the danger of being denied treatment; it also would have resulted in the ability of providers to provide more treatment to those who cannot afford to add additional funds on top of the government contribution. See generally the Powell Center's webinar on affording health care without rationing.
Section 3209 of the new law indirectly amends the section in the Medicare law as it previously existed that allowed private fee-for-service plans to set their premiums without approval by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) by adding, “Nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring the Secretary to accept any or every bid submitted by an MA organization under this subsection.”[endnote 2] This gives statutorily unlimited discretion to refuse to permit private-fee-for-service plans to charge premiums sufficient to offset the reductions in the Medicare government contribution.
Theoretically, of course, the federal bureaucrats given this new authority could choose not to exercise it. That seems highly unlikely during the Obama Administration, however, since on February 22, 2010 the President specifically proposed that the health bill include a provision under which Medicare Advantage plans (which, as noted, include the private-fee-for-service plans) would explicitly "be prohibited from charging seniors more than they would pay for services delivered under the traditional Medicare program."[endnote 3] While this explicit prohibition was not included in the final law (presumably because rules governing the “reconciliation” procedure did not permit it), it clearly demonstrates the policy stance of the Administration, which under Section 3209 it will now have authority to implement.
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION
Understanding how the health care bill that became law on March 23, 2010 gave power to the federal Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to limit senior citizens' right to add their own money requires following a complex trail within the bill and existing law to understand the effect of Section 3209. Under pre-existing law [42 U.S.C. § 1395w-24 (a)(6)(B)(i) & (ii)] [endnote 4], the Secretary of Health and Human Services has authority to “negotiate” the premiums to be charged by private Medicare plans (“Medicare Advantage” health insurance plans) – meaning that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) in HHS can keep a Medicare Advantage plan from participating unless it agrees to charge a premium acceptable to CMS– , but this authority did not apply to private fee-for-service plans [42 U.S.C. § 1395w-24 (a)(6)(B)(iv)] [endnote 5] – meaning that CMS had no power to impose a premium price control as a condition of participation for private fee-for-service plans, which could be excluded only if they failed to meet other applicable standards.
Section 3209 effectively trumps this crucial exemption by giving CMS the absolute and standardless discretion to reject premium “bids” by any Medicare Advantage plan, including a private fee-for-service plan. Specifically, it would add this subparagraph:
( c) Rejection of Bids.–This means that the previous law that effectively forbade the Secretary to exclude a private fee-for-service plan on the basis that CMS considered its premiums to be too high has been trumped by the new ability of the Secretary to reject “any or every” premium bid submitted by a private fee-for-service plan.
( i ) In general.–Nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring the Secretary to accept any or every bid submitted by an MA organization under this subsection.[endnote 6]
ENDNOTES
[1] Section 3209 takes effect with regard to plans that will be in operation in 2011. See Section 3209( c).
[2] Section 3209 is found on page 904-905 of the engrossed Senate-passed bill.
[3] The proposal appears under the heading, "Title III . . . Guaranteeing Benefits for Seniors by Ending Overpayments to Insurance Companies."
[4] 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-24 (a)(6)(B) reads, in relevant part (emphasis supplied):
(B) Acceptance and negotiation of bid amounts.[5] 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-24 (a)(6)(B)(iv) provides:
(i) Authority. Subject to clauses (iii) and (iv), the Secretary has the authority to negotiate regarding monthly bid amounts submitted under subparagraph (A) . . . in exercising such authority the Secretary shall have authority similar to the authority of the Director of the Office of Personnel Management with respect to health benefits plans under chapter 89 of title 5, United States Code [5 USCS §§ 8901 et seq.].
(ii) Application of FEHBP standard. Subject to clause (iv), the Secretary may only accept such a bid amount or proportion if the Secretary determines that such amount and proportions are supported by the actuarial bases provided under subparagraph (A) and reasonably and equitably reflects the revenue requirements (as used for purposes of section 1302(8) of the Public Health Service Act [42 USCS § 300e-1(8)] [relating to the standards for setting different rates for individuals and families and for individuals, small groups, and large groups]) of benefits provided under that plan.
(iv) Exception. In the case of a [private fee-for-service] plan described in section 1851(a)(2)(C) [42 USCS § 1395w-21(a)(2)(C)], the provisions of clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply and the provisions of paragraph (5)(B), prohibiting the review, approval, or disapproval of amounts described in such paragraph, shall apply to the negotiation and rejection of the monthly bid amounts and the proportions referred to in subparagraph (A).The “provisions of paragraph (5)(B)” incorporated by reference are:
(B) Exception. The Secretary shall not review, approve, or disapprove the amounts submitted under paragraph (3) or, in the case of an MA private fee-for-service plan, subparagraphs (A)(ii) and (B) of paragraph (4).Paragraph (4), subparagraph (A)(ii) reads "the amount of the Medicare + Choice [now called Medicare Advantage] monthly basic beneficiary premium”; paragraph (4), subparagraph (B) reads “Supplemental benefits. For benefits described in section 1852(a)(3) [42 USCS § 1395w-22(a)(3)], the amount of the Medicare + Choice monthly supplemental beneficiary premium (as defined in subsection (b)(2)(B)). "
[6] The new subparagraph ( C ) has been added to 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-24 (a)(5). Since the language of subparagraph (a)(6)(B) that prevents the Secretary from “negotiating” private fee-for-service plan premiums is based on incorporating by reference subparagraph (a)( 5)(B), as explained in the previous note, and because clause ( i ) of (a)(5)’s new subparagraph ( C ) prevents subparagraph (B) from being construed to limit the Secretary’s authority to reject bids, it effectively makes meaningless the premium negotiation prohibition of subparagraph (a)(6)(B).
